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The “Children of Crisis” – making sense of (post) socialism and the end of 
Yugoslavia 
 
In an article entitled “Did the Berlin Wall really come down on both sides?”, 
Janez Janša, a former high-ranking youth functionary, one of the main actors of the 
“Slovenian spring” and former Minister of defense and Prime Minister of Slovenia, 
referred disapprovingly to an ongoing process of “recommunisation of Slovenia and 
the Western Balkans.”i Positing himself as a member of a broader anti-communist 
group which allegedly was on the right side of history – “us political prisoners”ii – and 
referring to socialist Yugoslavia as “the small empire”iii, Janša concluded that “the 
neo-Communist propaganda nowadays is extremely powerful.”iv The post-Yugoslav 
space is no exception within the broader Eastern European context, where similar 
phenomena of portraying fascism and communism as moral equivalentsv and of 
“providing a heroic narrative that could provide the basis for political consensus in 
the present” have also been observed.vi Indeed, the collective remembering of the 
past is essentially a political process that revolves around the establishment of new 
collective identities and new principles of political legitimacy.vii Moreover, socialist 
political pasts have been left out from public profiles or are being used for 
contemporary political gains. As Daniel Singer put it, “From the Elbe to Vladivostok 
the number of former preachers of Marxism-Leninism now swearing by Frederich 
von Hayek and Milton Friedman tells us something about the moral flexibility of 
timeservers but also about the strength of their previous Marxist convictions.”viii   
Hence, the fact that, Janša’s Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) boycotted the 
central ceremony on Slovenia’s day of independence in 2013 as a sign of protest 
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against the presence of the red star symbol at the central celebration should not 
come as a surprise. The previous year, World War Two veterans were prohibited 
from attending the ceremony when the SDS was still in power, as they were accused 
of displaying symbols of a “former aggressor” and of the “communist regime”.ix Yet, 
such ideological maneuverings in the present hid a far more complex Yugoslav-era 
past. From a youth activist who led the section for General People’s Defense and 
Social Self-Protection in the Slovenian branch of the “League of Socialist Youth of 
Yugoslavia” in the 1980s, a self-styled dissident and an icon of Slovenian 
independence, Janša has transformed into a conservative politician and a staunch 
anti-communist. On the occasion of the commemoration of the “trial of the four”x in 
which Janša was involved and which has become one of the founding myths of the 
Slovenian independence, Dušan Keber, member of the Committee for the Defense 
of Human Rights summarized the sense of disillusionment with the contemporary 
political reality:  
“Could it have been otherwise? Was it necessary to throw out the baby with 
the dirty water of socialism? [Was it necessary] that we have forgotten about 
democracy the moment it became dependent on ourselves, that we did not 
set a vision about the kind of society and state we want to live in, that we 
have opened a hunt for the national wealth, that we started dancing around 
the golden calf of neoliberalism? Was that unavoidable? I am not convinced 
[that it was]. If we take into consideration the fact that rebels, whose rebellion 
brings them to power, are very diverse in their actions (the positive example 
of this is Nelson Mandela), I cannot escape the thought that the former dying 
regime should have thought twice when it was deciding its last victim.”xi   
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How to account for the often radical shifts in political beliefs and personal 
trajectories among individuals who were not only socialized within the Yugoslav 
socialist framework and the officially upheld values of brotherhood, unity, solidarity, 
social justice, internationalism, but also voluntarily and actively participated in its 
institutional youth/political structures? Certainly, the “irreversible impact”xii of the 
dramatic dissolution of Yugoslavia cannot be overstated in this regard. Yet, it is 
certainly not without a precedent, as major historical shifts and changes of socio-
political paradigms condition certain generations to transform and adapt. 
Acknowledging the importance of what other scholars studying age 
cohorts/generations in related historical contexts have pointed out as “structural 
opportunities at particular life stages”,xiii it could be inferred that every “loud” 
social/political generation has a constrained horizon of subversive, progressive 
potential and this generational horizon is confined within the boundaries of what had 
been considered politically, socially and culturally transgressive, alternative and new 
at a particular formative stage in a generation’s life span – generally between the 
ages of 18 and 28. Karl Mannheim’s original argument that posits early impressions 
as “tend[ing] to coalesce into a natural view of the world” and especially his 
assumption that “even if the rest of one’s life consisted in one long process of 
negation and destruction of the natural world view acquired in youth, the determining 
influence of these early impressions would still be predominant”xiv appear as relevant 
in this context. Indeed, individuals such as Janez Janša, who adopted a fervent anti-
Yugoslav rhetoric, actually built their new political identities in opposition rather than 
outside or beyond the Yugoslav/socialist frame of reference or their past experiences 
under socialism. As a matter of fact, the Yugoslav past and communism feature so 
prominently in Janša’s political discourse that one could easily conclude that “the 
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determining influence” of his Yugoslav experience/upbringing is not only 
“predominant”, but also defining of his transformed political views and post-Yugoslav 
self. Although he cannot be considered a typical representative of the last Yugoslav 
youth elite, Janša symbolises, most particularly for my Slovenian respondents, the 
downside of the post-1991 transition and embodies most of the negative aspects of 
post-Yugoslav politics.   
This paper seeks to trace certain (dis)continuities in the ways the late socialist 
Yugoslav youth elite made sense of the late socialist political and economic crisis 
and makes sense of the present post-socialist realities. It maintains that a process of 
progressive disillusionment with post-socialist politics fueled the development of 
somewhat subversive, alternative frames for non-institutionalized individual 
memories. In most of the Yugoslav successor states, to varying degrees, weak 
institutions, “consolidation of special interest groups”xv, and/or party politics rooted in 
identity politics have facilitated the consolidation of semi-authoritarian elites and a 
political culture that is a far cry from the once hoped for liberal democracy with a 
strong welfare component. As it was anecdotally observed, “The East Europeans, 
we saw, faced capitalism with great expectations. They thought they would be 
offered the choice between the Swedish and the German model. Instead, they were 
faced with a Latin American horizon.”xvi A sense of loss, disillusionment and betrayed 
hopes permeates individual testimonies a quarter of a century after the 
disappearance of socialism and the Yugoslav federation.  
This paper uses data from the last all-Yugoslav youth sociological study 
entitled Deca krize: omladina Jugoslavije krajem osamdesetih [The children of crisis: 
the Yugoslav youth at the end of the eighties]xvii, as well as oral history interviews, to 
reflect on the political subjectivities of the last socialist Yugoslav youth elite, the ways 
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in which respondents have attempted to make sense of their experiences in these 
new contexts and the trajectories that have been followed in the wake of 
Yugoslavia”s demise. It reflects on what in similar contexts has been termed “shifts 
across major moments of historical ruptures”xviii and it addresses different patterns of 
remembering, i.e. how people’s trajectories have shaped how they remember this 
period. My informants belonged to a range of groups who were active in the late 
socialist youth realm and/or contested the system from a variety of positions and 
from across the different Yugoslav republics. The excerpts cited in this article are 
drawn from a sample of forty oral history interviews which revolved around a pre-
drafted set of questions, although the format adopted was in general “semi-
structured”.xix 
The first part scrutinizes the sense of frustration and disillusionment with post-
socialist democracy and politics in general and demonstrates how these have fed 
into views of Yugoslav socialism as more inclusive, fair and emancipatory. The 
second part looks at the multi-layered meaning and shifting understanding of 
‘freedom’. Intertwined with reflections on the sense of ‘geo-political dignity’ that 
stemmed from Yugoslavia’s unique position in international relations, ‘freedom’ 
relates to a variety of benefits, privileges or experiences which are unavailable in the 
present. Finally, in light of the conclusion of the sociological youth survey that an 
ethno-national and a Yugoslav sense of belonging were seen by the majority of the 
young as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive, the third part addresses 
regional specificities in reflections on (generational) failure, responsibility and loss 




The Past is a Foreign Country – perceptions of a political anticlimax 
The post-socialist period saw members of the last generation of the Yugoslav 
League of Socialist Youth (LSY) take prominent roles in the political, media and 
cultural spheres of the different successor states. Many of those who had pioneered 
novel ideas, alternative styles and approaches in culture, journalism and politics in 
the 1980s became well-known editors, musicians, artists, senior managers, 
successful businessmen and high ranking politicians and have been at the helm of 
the contemporary cultural and political developments in the post-Yugoslav region. 
From the current Prime Minister of Montenegro, to the former President of Croatia, 
the current Macedonian President and the recently deposed Slovenian Prime 
Minister, the former socialist youth functionaries from the second half of the 1980s 
have controlled a significant portion of the post-Yugoslav political arena over the past 
twenty years. The violent break-up of Yugoslavia and the radical socio-political 
transformation shaped personal experiences and biographies in profound ways.   
Like elsewhere in the former Communist Bloc, one of the dominant public 
narratives in the region of the former Yugoslavia over the past two decades has 
been characterized by a tendency to reduce the past to listing the crimes of 
communism and portraying it as a deviation from a hypothetical normal course of 
development.xx At an individual level, some of the former youth functionaries who 
remained active in politics have tended to erase or suppress their Yugoslav/socialist 
past and the corresponding professional biographies.xxi Although different groups 
followed different trajectories – some remaining progressive/liberal, some turning 
conservative – there is a significant part of this generation who have refused to 
appropriate the anti-Yugoslav/anti-communist discourse or to think about the 
socialist past in these terms. They tend to view the late socialist anti-regime, pro-
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democratic youth initiatives as synonymous with a progressive wing of this younger 
age cohort, who lost in their progressive fights against an older post-WW2 
generation who embraced nationalist politics in the late 1980s. In addition, in oral 
history testimonies, members of the last Yugoslav youth elite tend to frame their 
experiences through the narrative of the generation that “lost”: its freedom, its 
dignity, and its superiority to the countries of the former Eastern Bloc.   
Arguably, social capital, i.e. membership in influential and well-positioned 
networks and technical ability, play a crucial role in elite reproduction.xxii The fact that 
a large number of the youth functionaries from the late 1980s became successful 
businessmen not only suggests that ideological rigidity was no longer paramount in 
the second half of the 1980s and that the higher levels of the League of Socialist 
Youth were occupied by career-seeking individuals whose activism was largely 
formalized, but also that these networks survived the collapse of socialist 
Yugoslavia.xxiii Moreover, these individuals were at the beginning of their professional 
careers in the late 1980s when the reforms of the federal government concerning 
private entrepreneurship were implemented and the Youth League itself got involved 
by acting as an umbrella for the so-called “new production units”xxiv (many of which 
were set up as small computing firms) or by organising seminars “for training of 
entrepreneurial cadres”xxv – like the Macedonian League of Socialist Youth did, for 
instance, in 1989.  
The allusion to Janša as the very opposite of a figure such as Nelson 
Mandela in the above excerpt is illustrative of a sense of disillusionment which was 
present in many of the oral history testimonies I collected. Indeed, the progressively 
oriented part of the youth elite – in particular those who continued to work as 
journalists or entered the civil society sector – tended to be both highly critical of 
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post-Yugoslav politics, and to idealize the 1980s, at least to a certain degree. In this 
sense, the 1980s operate for them as a moment of lost possibilitiesxxvi – not an era 
that they would wish to actually return to, but, rather, a starting point for the 
construction of a new post-socialist world that they were unable to defend. Criticism 
targeting the reduction of post-socialist politics to elections and the struggle for 
power and of the free market to ruthless capitalism and withering away of the welfare 
state was present in most of the interviews I conducted and appears as particularly 
common among the media and cultural elite. This is also the group which tends to 
embody the narratives of cosmopolitanism and loss of dignity. With the benefit of 
hindsight, individuals tend to critically distribute the burden of responsibility for the 
problematic post-socialist transition which stemmed from the Yugoslav wars between 
the different political and social actors. However, there is a shared belief that some 
things could have been done differently to prevent the disastrous outcomes of the 
Yugoslav crisis of the 1980s. Numerous testimonies and popular narratives reinforce 
the sense of disillusionment with post-socialist politics and underline the gap 
between the progressive vs. nationalist/conservative camp. This is conveyed 
strongly in the testimony of Nataša Sukič who was one of the founders of the lesbian 
youth activist core in Slovenia in the late 1980s and is still actively involved in the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA Europe):   
I didn’t think it was right not to have choice in the political sense, but if we 
compare it to today – what do we have now? We have an illusion, it’s a huge 
trick. I think at the time there was more transparency. There was an opening up 
of the [social] space and there was a spirit, an atmosphere of freedom in the air. 
That disappeared with the dissolution of the country, with the rise of nationalism, 
with the strengthening of the church and of conservative values. With the death of 
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the welfare state and this brutal capitalism, I think Yugoslavia was great (laughs) 
– when I compare it to today. It was great. They should have done more to 
introduce political pluralism and it is such a pity it [the break-up] happened. 
The disillusionment with politics echoed above is a shared sentiment among 
the once aspiring journalists and artists some of whom have remained prominent as 
senior editors and well-known musicians. Bosnian journalist Senad Pećanin echoed 
a shared narrative among liberal circles in the post-Yugoslav region that it was 
ethno-chauvinism that replaced socialism and that the rise of politics leaning towards 
an exclusivist far-right ideology is the result of the nationalist euphoria and the 
political shifts during the break-up of Yugoslavia. It is this subjective experience of 
the past twenty years and the sense of a perpetual crisis that frames the perception 
of Yugoslav socialism as emancipatory and hence more benign:     
The book by Koštunica and Čavoškixxvii was banned and I made photocopies of it. 
I had Čavoški as a guest in my program, I thought they were democrats. Our 
tragedy here is that those who were “dissidents”, were actually fascists, 
nationalists. That’s the difference between here and Poland, the Czech Republic 
– there you had Havel as a dissident, while here you had Tuđman, Dobrica 
Čosić, Alija Izetbegović, Paraga, Šešelj, Šeks. That’s our tragedy. There lies the 
key to our tragedy […] That regime was doubtless undemocratic, we shouldn’t 
glorify it. But, compared to this… That regime was not fascist. These are fascists. 
These are fascists. In that sense, that regime was one hundred times more 
humane. With all of its flaws – it was authoritarian, it was undemocratic, it had 
one hundred flaws. But it wasn’t a regime with prominent features of fascism, like 
these ones...  
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A sense of defeatism and disillusionment with the prospect of any vaguely 
liberal or civic-oriented political platform replacing a type of politics preoccupied with 
the (ethno) national is detectable among those who enthusiastically embraced 
vaguely defined liberal values in their youth. As the last war sealed an ethno-
nationally coded consensus in Bosnia-Herzegovina and post-Yugoslav politics is 
mainly shaped around the ethno-national paradigm, Rasim Kadić, president of the 
Bosnian Liberal-Democratic party from its establishment until 2005, recently recalled: 
“Our assurance that multi-ethnic democracy was possible cost us dearly. My Liberal 
Party never won more than three percent of votes [...] Now, from this perspective, it 
is clear that, unfortunately, in the Balkans, in the region of the former Yugoslavia, 
there is an absolute and exclusive domination of ethnic collectivities, of tribes, and 
democracy is possible only within mono-ethnic tribal communities.”xxviii   
Some of the findings of the last Yugoslav youth survey shed light on this 
sense of betrayed hopes and pessimism. Namely, it revealed a notable decline in the 
support for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the self-management 
system in practice and an overwhelming discontent with the process of 
democratisation. Yet, the last Yugoslav generation still showed considerable support 
for “socialism as theory” (fifty-three percent of the respondents)xxix and demonstrated 
a surprising level of “utopian consciousness”xxx, i.e. a considerably large percentage 
of the respondents expressed hopes that their individual future and the future of the 
society in general would be betterxxxi. On the contrary, the wide horizon of 
expectations of this generation was curbed in the post-1991 period and many of the 
hopes for a better, less corrupt and more functional political and economic system 




The Elusive Dream – reflections on freedom 
Two narratives featured prominently in a considerable number of the 
interviews I conducted, although none of the questions I posed had specifically 
raised it: the narratives of freedom and (loss of) dignity - the latter related to what 
has been termed “a sense of geopolitical dignity”.xxxii This tells us as much about the 
struggles, debates and aspirations of this generation in the 1980s as it tells us about 
their present preoccupations and disillusionment with the contemporary state of 
affairs in the post-Yugoslav context. It also exposes a key semantic transposition of 
the concept and the very understanding of freedom. In the 1980s, it was a 
generational obsession with freedom understood as political and civil rights (primarily 
freedom of expression and speech). Today, the concept has been taken to its other 
extreme semantic pole and has become synonymous with the freedom of travel and 
the social and economic rights – two features of their lives under Yugoslav socialism 
which are now, to varying degrees, diminished. Interviewees often captured this idea 
by contrasting their sense of being free “then” and being unfree “now”. Freedom, 
thus, becomes a thread which links the past and the present and to a certain degree 
legitimises an oppositional subjectivity. The last Yugoslav youth survey hinted at a 
prominent sense of Europeanness and a perceived superiority of the West European 
economic model. Asked about the changes in the Yugoslav economic system, the 
respondents declared preferences for a market economy (“like the one in the West”), 
private property and an accession to the European Economic Community: for sixty-
four percent of the respondents joining the European common market was a 
preferential option.xxxiii  
The narrative of geo-political dignity featured more prominently among 
interviewees who were citizens of those Yugoslav republics that were subject to a 
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restrictive travel visa policy and whose countries of residence still experience a high 
level of socio-political and economic difficulties (such as Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia). It was generally conveyed through reflections on 
Yugoslavia’s former prestige and prominence on the international scene. The flexible 
contours of the Yugoslav geopolitical mobility map, the “red” Yugoslav passport 
which guaranteed the freedom of travel, the perceived relative superiority and 
competitiveness in the international arenas of culture and sport all act as symbolic 
devices and as channels of articulation of a strong internationalist/Eurocentric 
generational identity among the interviewees, which in itself mirrors a particular 
framing of the concept of freedom. Freedom understood as mobility within Europe 
and beyond and dignity understood as the ability to engage with the wider world and 
compete on a European or international stage (be it in sports or music) implicitly 
extend legitimacy to Yugoslav citizenship and the Yugoslav geopolitical stature. It 
also implies the proximity to Europe and the world “then”, constantly positing it 
against a sense of isolation and remoteness from the centre-stage developments in 
Europe and the world “now”.  
Indeed, a sense of a different engagement with the western world was central 
to the generational self-definition found in interviews almost three decades later. In 
the majority of the testimonies the first memories of one’s youth are associated with 
foreign things, in particular foreign travel. This could be said to be primarily linked to 
the 20-year trauma of restricted visa travel in the post-Yugoslav states (with the 
exception of Slovenia and Croatia), as well as to the phenomenon of the a posteriori 
mythologisation of the Yugoslav passport.xxxiv This arguably persists in the form of a 
trans-generational sense of entrapment which had only recently been alleviated with 
the visa liberalisation process for the Western Balkans. As has been observed, 
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“moving down the generations, to a degree, the sense of humiliation persisted 
vicariously, whereby the point of reference became the (possibility to) travel that the 
red [Yugoslav] passport had granted one’s parents”.xxxv Macedonian guitarist Vlatko 
Stefanovski fused a narrative of dignity with the narrative of freedom, while recalling 
his first trip to Britain: 
As far as freedom, the feeling of freedom is concerned…the feeling of being in 
possession of a red passport with which you could travel freely all around the 
world without having to apply for visas – from today’s perspective, that was 
utopia. Now I realize that we lived in a very happy and stable time. I remember 
when aged 18, I went to London to buy my first guitar… On Oxford Street in 
London you could exchange Yugoslav dinars into pounds. How does this sound 
to you now? As mission impossible, right? So, at the currency exchange point on 
Oxford Street you had “Yugoslav dinars”. So, you gave your dinars – I don’t 
remember exactly what the exchange rate was – but it’s been a long time that I 
haven’t experienced that sense of freedom… All these social uncertainties, 
political uncertainties, security-related uncertainties now… as if the world starts to 
lose its nerves and starts to burst at its seams.  
Alluding to the past as a utopian “chronotope” and to the opportunity to 
exchange currency in the heart of London as “mission impossible” from a 
contemporary perspective clearly delineates an attitude of disappointment with the 
present state of affairs. By reminiscing about the past, about the freedom to travel 
without restrictions and to exchange money on Oxford Street, the interviewee made 
a statement about the present inability to travel without a visa to Britain or see the 
Macedonian currency quoted on an exchange rate board in London. Bearing in mind 
that this is a testimony of a highly successful musician who still regularly tours and 
performs abroad, and yet so strongly conveys a sense of loss, one could infer that 
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this narrative thickens, as it were, and that it becomes even more prominent moving 
down the social strata towards those who were more severely affected by the break-
up of the state and the transformation of the socio-political system.xxxvi  
Dragan Kremer was a music critic and journalist in several youth media in the 
1980s. He also chose to begin his testimony by pointing out the freedom and the 
opportunity to travel, as well as by mapping out the geopolitical and the cultural 
imaginarium of this generation: 
To be honest, I don’t envy the contemporary young generations. Very few young 
people can and do travel and this is not only valid for Serbia’s smaller cities, but 
also for Belgrade. People from my generation, from Belgrade, used to go on their 
first bigger trip after turning 18 – hitchhiking, Inter-rail. Of course, both here and 
abroad those were safer times – we can only dream of that now. The only way 
my parents could know where I was during those one or two months was by me 
phoning them twice per week – I could have as well been in London, in 
Amsterdam or in a roadside phone booth in Sweden.   
Indeed, mentioning London, Amsterdam and Sweden serves to map out the contours 
of that (Western) European space, its width and accessibility. Hence, Western 
Europe and Britain in particular stand out as the cultural points of reference.  
A prominent thread within the narrative of (loss of) dignity is the conviction that 
Yugoslavia was at least in two spheres equal to the otherwise superior West: 
sportxxxvii and music. The youth of the 1980s in popular memory features principally 
as an embodiment of a phenomenal musical/cultural/artistic output. Indeed, new 
music styles, regional scenes, a burgeoning domestic music industry, the openness 
to Western cultural influences and a youth organization that began to accommodate 
and promote alternative cultural expression elevated youth music culture in the 
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1980s to a new level. This generation was also the initiator of a novel attitude which 
was one of a will to interact and compete with the West and Western culture, and not 
simply consume, follow or copy Western European trends. Mirko Ilić, an illustrator 
and a designer from Zagreb associated with the “New Square” group of comic book 
artists connected with the New wave scene and the youth magazine Polet, conveys 
this sense of ambition of competing on a larger, global scale: “It was a time of idea 
exchange, matching intellectual wits… I learned to be daring and ask for the 
impossible. We had the feeling that we were shattering institutions, we did not want 
to succeed here, we wanted to compete with the entire world, because we believed 
that there were no limits.”xxxviii Branko Kostelnik, a young journalist in the 1980s, 
echoed this sentiment in the introduction for his book of interviews with prominent 
rock/punk Yugoslav artists by evoking the common trope of urban, cosmopolitan 
cultural identity: “I sincerely hope that this book will give a little contribution to the 
struggle for urbanity, freedom and equality, for… In memory of the time when the 
world was young and when, except in sport, even for a moment we were equal to the 
West. In opposition and despite everything which is happening to us today. 
There!”xxxix 
Essentially, freedom becomes an umbrella term which denotes and connotes 
all sorts of experiences which seem unavailable in the present and were available in 
the past in a wider framework – Yugoslav, European or international. The following 
excerpt from the testimony by Macedonian journalist and political analyst Sašo 
Ordanoski refers to “cosmopolitanism” as the very source of that freedom: 
Freedom is not necessarily related only to the fact of whether a regime is 
repressive or not. Freedom comes as a result of the possibility to be exposed to 
the resources of some kind of cosmopolitanism. I haven’t been to the theatre in 
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the past few years – there is nothing to see here. While at the time I used to 
watch fifty plays a year. So, when you find yourself in a situation when there is 
not one theatre production which would motivate you to visit the theatre, of 
course you don’t feel free. When I had a chance to watch the greatest names in 
world drama in Macedonia and not to mention Yugoslavia, of course I felt 
freedom as if it was being administered intravenously – it comes with the air 
you breathe […] Talking from my own experience as a journalist, at the time I 
was able to write what I wanted, when I wanted, where I wanted…  
While a legitimate grievance of a segment of the population that became 
culturally and politically marginalised in the post-Yugoslav era, this pattern of 
reminiscing could be also interpreted as illustrative of a rather exaggerated sense of 
superiority and over-confidence that was at least partially a result of the projected 
and publicly reinforced image of Yugoslav exceptionalism. In that sense, this 
retrospective appropriation of official state narratives could be interpreted both as a 
result of the negative experiences of the 1990s, but also of a widely shared belief at 
the time that by not aligning itself with either Bloc in the Cold War, Yugoslavia 
pursued a morally superior foreign policy. 
Indeed, allusions to Yugoslavia’s cultural “Europeanness” reveal an 
awareness of a contemporary state of inferiority. Hence, the trauma of the break-up 
essentially becomes a trauma of losing an equal footing with regard to Europe, the 
perceived equality being a reflection of present-day grievances about the domination 
of everything which stands in contrast to subjective memories and to individual 






Wither Yugoslavia - loss and responsibility 
Not only the sense of achievement in two international arenas such as sport 
and music has fed into the narrative of loss of geopolitical dignity, it also significantly 
conditioned the way this generation perceived Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism before 
1991. Senad Pećanin recalled the last appearance of the Yugoslav national soccer 
team at the 1990 World Cup in Italy and echoed the prevalent perception of 
Yugoslavism through a cultural lens:  
We perceived Yugoslavism as a cultural concept, but also through sport. In 
1990 we went to Italy for the World Cup. Ever since, I love [footballer Dragan 
Stojković] Piksi as my own brother. We watched the match against Spain, Piksi 
scored two goals and we won 2:1. That was actually the last appearance of the 
Yugoslav team… I told my friend: “Bro, keep an eye on me, if the Spanish 
score, I might have a heart attack.” In that sense, we really felt Yugoslavia as 
our country, our homeland.  
 
When asked to declare whether and to what extent they were prepared to 
personally engage in the preservation and realization of some group interests and 
tendencies, the majority of young respondents in 1989 – fifty-four percent of them - 
chose “SFR Yugoslavia as a whole”.xl Although the authors of the survey noted that 
there were differences along national/regional lines, the research found that the 
preparedness for engagement for the interests of one’s nation and the interest of 
Yugoslavia as a whole were actually connected as “for the majority of the young 
these two attitudes do not appear as incompatible.”xli Indeed, an ethno-national and 
a Yugoslav sense of belonging seen as complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive persisted until very late into the decade.xlii  
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However, the last few years before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, at the 
apex of ethno-national homogenization, cultural Yugoslavism became unpopular and 
ostracized. The Bosnian student magazine Valter, for instance, referred to those who 
“nourish a sense of Yugoslavism” as “Balkan Palestinians”, who “know very well 
where and how far the territory which is supposed to be their homeland stretches, 
but, unfortunately, it is nowhere to be found.”xliii Hence, a sense of failure and 
personal responsibility is often more acute nowadays among those who appropriated 
a wider, non-ethnic, Yugoslav cultural identity. Branko Greganović, former president 
of the federal League of Socialist Youth and currently involved in the business sector 
observed: 
We, the Yugoslavs – quote/unquote, turned out to be very naïve. We definitely 
did not have a critical mass… Have you read Andrić’s novel Gospođica [The 
Woman from Sarajevo]? Andrić writes there how every forty years the ragtag 
descends from the mountains. Those are Andrić’s words. That is that cycle that 
no one was aware of at the time, no one […] Our generation was not up to the 
task.   
Zoran Kostov, currently university professor of journalism and media, was 
editor-in-chief of the main student magazine in Macedonia. He also reflected in a 
self-critical manner on this generation’s responsibility, highlighting the specific role of 
that generation in the Macedonian context: 
That generation had a chance. In this sense, I am also self-critical. [I was] editor 
of a magazine, member of the presidency and first president of the Youth 
Council. I am in a refuge, I am a refugee, this is my refuge [points to his office], 
instead of jumping into the flame. You can’t change anything if you don’t enter 
there. Somehow, I never jumped into the flame and always remained on the side. 
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I carry part of the responsibility that that generation is an unsuccessful story […] 
Sometimes it’s about the combination of circumstances, sometimes it’s about the 
responsibility of a generation. Did the generation fail to consolidate itself? I don’t 
know. 
Although there are overlapping narratives and patterns in how the 
interviewees relate to the socialist past and the post-socialist present, they also differ 
in many ways, which is primarily conditioned by the different socio-political contexts 
of each of the Yugoslav successor states. The wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia in the 1990s, the high levels of inflation in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo in 
the 1990s, the peaceful secession of Macedonia and the rapid “Europeanisation” of 
Slovenia engendered diverse post-socialist experiences and consequently different 
reflections on the past. Among the Macedonian interviewees a sense of loss and 
disappointment prevails, along with manifestations of the small-nation syndrome that 
one comes across in Slovenia, too. As Ordanoski put it: 
Yugoslavia was a big country. Macedonia is small […] There was a clash of 
histories, mentalities, traditions, which allowed you to participate in debates which 
opened up all possible aspects. And this provincial spirit which exists today 
because of the dimensions of the state we live in, did not exist at the time. 
Secondly, it’s also a numbers’ game: when you live in a country of twenty two 
million the opportunities are understandably bigger than in a country of two 
million. Today I say that Macedonia has two buses full of smart people, around 
one hundred people who can fit in two buses. Yugoslavia was “only” ten times 
bigger. After all, that comes up to twenty buses. Thanks to that there was a 
debate. The communism I remember was not oppressive and was already 
waning, the regime missed its chance to reform itself in the sixties, it was too 
fragmented to forge some authoritarian action on Yugoslav level…  
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Nataša Sukič similarly underlined the benefit of living in a larger multi-cultural 
environment, where cultural differences cross-fertilised in the realm of culture and the 
arts: 
At the time I was very young. But if I look back now, I think in every sense there 
was a functional multicultural community – in culture, in art…a sense of solidarity 
in everything. It all contributed to having a broader worldview than today. 
Obviously there was nationalism, if there wasn’t those terrible things would not 
have happened, but I never saw or felt that people carried that inside themselves. 
Then you had the media campaign for several years which unleashed the 
hatred…       
In terms of context-specific narratives, understandably, a significant part of the 
testimonies of my Bosnian interviewees revolved around the violent conflict which for 
them accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia. Senad Pećanin related his 
scepticism towards a generational label with the profound personal disbelief and 
disappointment caused by the eruption of the war and the departure/exile of many 
public figures who belonged to that generation,xliv among whom was an iconic 
representative of the Bosnian youth cultural scene and the New Primitives 
movement – musician and actor Nenad Janković (Nele Karajlić):                           
I don’t know if I could talk in generational terms, if all of that happened by 
accident… if perhaps we were just moving in circles of like-minded people. I 
don’t know to what extent we are a representative sample of our generation […] 
I mean… Nele… Awful… One can’t explain that. How, how can I then speak 
about a generation? Nele is also part of our generation… We are not 
representatives [of that generation], we don’t have the right […] We constantly 
move within the same circle of ten people, we think in the same way, we joke in 
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the same way. We actually don’t know, things have changed so much […] I 
mean – a war in Sarajevo! I don’t know what would have been more 
improbable than a war!  
This strong conviction about the improbability of war and disintegration of the country 
was widely shared up until the escalation of the first armed conflicts. Dejan Jović was 
involved both in the Croatian youth press and in the League of Socialist Youth. His 
testimony echoes Pećanin’s refusal to consider a violent break-up as a probable 
outcome of the Yugoslav crisis: 
The break-up of Yugoslavia was absolutely nowhere near our horizon, we never 
thought about it. On the other hand, we feared nationalism and the 
disintegration of the cultural and the political space, which was already 
becoming visible […] We had a dilemma. We did have a Yugoslav view on 
things […] I wrote a lot about the church in the youth press […] A lot of the 
things the church was doing seemed nationalist and hence unacceptable. No 
one expects the church to be pro-communist, of course, but it seemed to me 
that they were deliberately provoking nationalist sentiments. So, my attacks and 
my critique were motivated by that, by a fear from nationalism. Retrospectively 
looking, it seems we detected some things correctly, but if you ask me if we 
thought whether Yugoslavia could fall apart – I personally never thought that 
Yugoslavia could fall apart.  
 
Conclusion 
The last Yugoslav generation has been generally remembered thorough its 
achievements in culture and sport in the 1980s. It has been often representedxlv  as a 
generation which epitomizes urbanity, cosmopolitanism, non-conformism and late 
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Yugoslav culture. In reality, individuals who were actively involved in late socialist 
youth politics, media or culture followed diverse trajectories – some pursued their 
“non-conformist” engagements in the realms of media, culture and arts, some 
remained wholly or partially faithful to their liberal/progressive youthful ideals, while 
some chose to abandon/erase their socialist past and redefine their politics. 
 Narratives of defeat, generational responsibility, loss of “geo-political dignity” 
and disillusionment with the post-Yugoslav reality and post-socialist politics were 
intertwined among my interviewees with wider reflections on the Yugoslav past, as 
well as with evocations of a sense of cosmopolitanism, a different way of engaging 
with both the Eastern and the Western world and a somewhat generational 
obsession with freedom. Indeed, individual professional trajectories and the different 
post-Yugoslav trajectories of the federation’s successor states prove to be 
determining of the ways individuals reflect on their generational experience, on the 
1980s and on the Yugoslav past.  
The paper sought to shed light on the ways the late socialist Yugoslav youth 
made sense of the crisis and the impending reforms at the end of the 1980s, 
articulated its values and envisioned its future, and framed the memories of that past 
a quarter of a century later. The paper maintained that a process of progressive 
disillusionment with post-socialist politics has spurred the emergence of alternative, 
non-hegemonic mnemonic frames which deviate from the official public narratives 
that tend to reduce Yugoslav socialism to totalitarianism. A somewhat inflated 
horizon of expectations in 1989-1990, betrayed hopes and a contemporary crisis of 
liberal democracy and lack of political alternatives generally underpin the individual 
memories of the Yugoslav “crisis generation”, memories that are nevertheless not 
uncritical of the Yugoslav socialist past, but certainly echo Nancy Fraser’s vision of 
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““another “postsocialism”, one that incorporates, rather than repudiates, the best of 
socialism.”xlvi      
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